Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using DTCP Certificate

Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using DTCP Certificate Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.

858 Coal Creek Circle Louisville CO 80023 USA d.thakore@cablelabs.com

Security Transport Layer Security TLS SupplementalData DTCP This document specifies the use of Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP) certificates as an authorization data type in the authorization extension for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol. This is in accordance with the guidelines for authorization extensions as specified in . As with other TLS extensions, this authorization data can be included in the client and server Hello messages to confirm that both parties support the desired authorization data types. If supported by both the client and the server, DTCP certificates are exchanged in the supplemental data TLS handshake message as specified in RFC4680. This authorization data type extension is in support of devices containing DTCP certificates, issued by the Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator .

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol (TLS1.0, TLS1.1, TLS1.2) is being used in an ever increasing variety of operational environments, the most common among which is its use in securing HTTP traffic (). introduces extensions that enable TLS to operate in environments where authorization information needs to be exchanged between the client and the server before any protected data is exchanged. The use of these TLS authorization extensions is especially attractive since it allows the client and server to determine the type of protected data to exchange based on the authorization information received in the extensions. A substantial number of deployed consumer electronics devices such as televisions, tablets, game consoles, set-top boxes and other multimedia devices contain issued Digital Transmission Content Protection certificates. These DTCP certificates enable secure transmission of premium audio-visual content between devices over various types of links (e.g., DTCP over IP). These DTCP certificates can also be used to verify device functionality (e.g., supported device features) This document describes the format and necessary identifiers to exchange DTCP certificates within the supplemental data message (see ) while negotiating a TLS session. The DTCP certificates are then used independent of their use for content protection (e.g., to verify supported features) and the corresponding DTCP Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) protocol. This communication allows either the client or the server or both to perform certain actions or provide specific services. The actual semantics of the authorization decision by the client/server are beyond the scope of this document. The DTCP certificate, which is not an X.509 certificate, can be cryptographically tied to the X.509 certificate being used during the TLS tunnel establishment by an EC-DSA signature.

DTCP-enabled consumer electronics devices (eg. televisions, game consoles) use DTCP certificates for secure transmission of audio-visual content. The Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) protocol defined in is used to exchange DTCP Certificates and allows a device to be identified and authenticated based on the information in the DTCP Certificate. However these DTCP-enabled devices offer additional functionality (e.g., via HTML5 User Agents or web enabled applications) that is distinct from its capability to transmit and play audio-visual content. The mechanism outlined in this document allows a DTCP-enabled consumer electronics device to authenticate and authorize using its DTCP Certificate when accessing services over the internet; for example ,web applications on televisions that can enable value-added services. This is anticipated to be very valuable since there are a considerable number of such devices. The re-use of well-known web security will also keep such communication consistent with existing standards and best practices.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

DTCP certificates issued by to DTLA-compliant devices come in three general variations (see , Section 4.2.3.1) Typically issued to devices with limited computation resources. This is the most commonly issued certificate format. Format 1 certificates include a unique Device ID and device EC-DSA public/private key pair generated by the DTLA. (See Section 4.3 of ) This is issued to devices that possess additional functions (e.g., additional channel ciphers, specific device properties). The presence of these additional functions is indicated by the device capability mask as specified in Section 4.2.3.2 of the DTCP specification. Format 2 certificates also include a unique Device ID and device EC-DSA public/private key pair generated by the DTLA. (See Section 4.3 of ) The mechanism specified in this document allows only Format 1 and Format 2 DTCP certificates to be exchanged in the supplemental data message since it requires the use of the EC-DSA private key associated with the certificate.

Figure 1 illustrates the exchange of SupplementalData message during the TLS handshake as specified in and is repeated here for convenience:

ServerHello(with extensions) SupplementalData* Certificate* ServerKeyExchange* CertificateRequest* <-------- ServerHelloDone SupplementalData* Certificate* ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify* [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished --------> [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- Finished Application Data <-------> Application Data * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent. [] Indicates that ChangeCipherSpec is an independent TLS protocol content type; it is not a TLS handshake message. ]]> TLS handshake message exchange with Supplemental Data

defines two authorization extension types that are used in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages and are repeated below for convenience:

A client uses the client_authz and server_authz extensions in the ClientHello message to indicate that it will send client authorization data and receive server authorization data respectively in the SupplementalData messages. A server uses the extensions in a similar manner in its ServerHello message. also establishes a registry that is maintained by IANA for registering authorization data formats. This document defines a new authorization data type for both the client_authz and server_authz extensions and allows the client and server to exchange DTCP certificates in the SupplementalData message.

Section 3 of specifies the syntax of the supplemental data message when carrying the authz_data message that is negotiated in the client_authz and/or server_authz types. This document defines a new authorization data format that is used in the authz_data message when sending DTCP Authorization data.

The DTCP Authorization type definition in the TLS Authorization Data Formats registry is:

Note to RFC Editor: Please populate the number assigned by IANA

The DTCP Authorization data is used when the AuthzDataFormat type is dtcp_authorization. The syntax of the authorization data is:

; uint16 ASN.1Cert_length; opaque ASN.1Cert<0..2^24-1>; } DigitallySignedData; struct { DigitallySignedData certs; opaque signature[40]; } dtcp_authz_data; ]]> RandomNonce is generated by the server and consists of 32 bytes generated by a high quality secure random number generator. The RandomNonce helps detect replay attacks. DTCPCert is the sender's DTCP certificate, see Section 4.2.3.1 of the DTCP Specification ASN.1Cert is the sender's certificate used to establish the TLS session, i.e., sent in the Certificate or ClientCertificate message using the Certificate structure defined in Section 7.4.2 of . If the ASN.1Cert is not being sent, the ASN.1Cert_length MUST be zero. DigitallySignedData - contains the RandomNonce, DTCP Certificate and the optional ASN.1 Certificate. This is then followed by the digital signature covering the RandomNonce, DTCP Certificate and the ASN.1 certificate if it is present. The signature is generated using the private key associated with the DTCP certificate using the Signature Algorithm and Hash Algorithm as specified in Section 4.4 of . This signature provides proof of the possession of the private key by the sender. A sender sending its own DTCP Certificate MUST populate the certs field.

A client includes both the client_authz and server_authz extensions in the extended client hello message when indicating its desire to exchange DTCP authorization data with the server. Additionally, the client includes the AuthzDataFormat type specified in in the extension_data field to specify the format of the authorization data. A client will receive the server's dtcp_authz_data before it sends its own dtcp_authz_data. When sending its own dtcp_authz_data message, the client includes the same RandomNonce that it receives in the server's dtcp_authz_data message. Clients include its DTCP Certificate in the dtcp_authz_data message. If the client wants to cryptographically tie its dtcp_authz_data with the TLS session, then the client includes the ASN.1 Certificate used to establish the TLS session (certificate in the ClientCertificate message) in the ASN.1Cert field in dtcp_authz_data.

A server responds with both the client_authz and server_authz extensions in the extended server hello message when indicating its desire to exchange dtcp_authorization data with the client. Additionally, the server includes the AuthzDataFormat type specified in in the extension_data field to specify the format of the dtcp_authorization data. A server always generates and populates the RandomNonce in the dtcp_authz_data message. If the client's hello message does not contain both the client_authz and server_authz extensions with dtcp_authorization type, the server MUST NOT include support for dtcp_authorization data in its hello message. A server MAY include its DTCP Certificate in the dtcp_authz_data message. If the server includes its DTCP Certificate, it MUST also include its server certificate (sent in the TLS Certificate message) in the certs field to cryptographically tie its dtcp_authz_data with the TLS session being established.

Based on the usage rules in the sections above, Figure 2 below provides one possible TLS message exchange where the client sends its DTCP Certificate to the server within the dtcp_authz_data message.

ServerHello(with extensions) SupplementalData(with Nonce N1) Certificate ServerKeyExchange* CertificateRequest <-------- ServerHelloDone SupplementalData(with Data D1) Certificate ClientKeyExchange CertificateVerify [ChangeCipherSpec] Finished --------> [ChangeCipherSpec] <-------- Finished Application Data <-------> Application Data N1 Random nonce generated by server D1 Contains dtcp_authz_data populated with the following {(N1, DTCP Cert, Client X.509 Cert) Signature over all elements} * Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent. [] Indicates that ChangeCipherSpec is an independent TLS protocol content type; it is not a TLS handshake message. ]]>

This document reuses TLS Alert messages for any errors that arise during authorization processing, and reuses the AlertLevels as specified in . Additionally the following AlertDescription values are used to report errors in dtcp_authorization processing:

This document proposes a new entry to be registered in the IANA-maintained TLS Authorization Data Formats registry for dtcp_authorization(TBA). This registry is defined in and defines two ranges: one is IETF review and the other is specification required. The value for dtcp_authorization should be assigned via Specification Required. Note to RFC Editor: Please populate the number assigned by IANA in TBA above.

This document specifies a TLS authorization data extension that allows TLS clients and servers to exchange DTCP certificates during a TLS handshake exchange. The dtcp_authorizaton data as specified in this document carries the DTCP Certificate that identified the associated device. Given that it is anticipated by DTCP to be shared in the open (e.g., similar to its usage in AKE), this document does not add any additional security threats (e.g., confidentiality). Further its integrity is ensured by the TLS protocol. Hence the security considerations specified in and apply to the extension specified in this document. In addition, the dtcp_authorization data may be carried along with other supplemental data or some other authorization data and that information may require additional protection. In cases where the supplemental data contains sensitive information, the double handshake technique described in can be used to provide protection for the supplemental data information. The double handshake specified in assumes that the client knows the context of the TLS session that is being set up and uses the authorization extensions as needed. illustrates a variation of the double handshake that addresses the case where the client may not have a priori knowledge that it will be communicating with a server capable of exchanging dtcp_authz_data (typical for https connections; see ). In Figure 3, the client's Hello messages includes the client_authz and server_authz extensions. The server simply establishes an encrypted TLS session with the client in the first handshake by not indicating support for any authz extensions. The server initiates a second handshake by sending a HelloRequest. The second handshake will include server's support for authz extensions which will result in SupplementalData being exchanged. This double handshake mechanism is vulnerable to the TLS MITM Renegotiation exploit as explained in . In order to address this vulnerability, clients and servers MUST use the secure_renegotiation extension as specified in when performing a double handshake. It should be noted that for double handshake to succeed, any extension (e.g., TLS Session Ticket ) that results in the TLS Handshake sequence being modified may result in failure to exchange SupplementalData.

The author wishes to thank Mark Brown, Sean Turner, Sumanth Channabasappa; and the Chairs (EKR, Joe Saloway) and members of the TLS Working Group who provided feedback and comments on one or more revisions of this document. This document derives its structure and much of its content from , and .

&RFC2119; The TLS Protocol Version 1.0 Certicom

tdierks@certicom.com

Certicom

callen@certicom.com

The TLS Protocol Version 1.1 The TLS Protocol Version 1.2 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental Data Microsoft Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions RedPhone Security Vigil Security Digital Transmission Content Protection Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator DTCP Volume 1 Supplement E Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator &RFC2629; &RFC3552; &RFC5226; DTLA Digital Transmission Licensing Administrator HTTP over TLS RTFM, Inc. Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State Cisco System Nokia Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote Columbia University

This becomes an Appendix.